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Last summer, when a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit issued its initial ruling in United States v. Thurston,1 it plunged into
a war between federal judges and Congress, as well as between district and
appellate courts, over how much flexibility trial judges have to tailor
criminal sentences as they see fit. The war began nearly two decades ago
with the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 19842 and the
subsequent enactment in 1987 of the comprehensive Sentencing Guidelines
regime.3 It flared up anew in April 2003, with the passage of the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of
Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003,4 Congress's latest attempt to rein
in the discretion of sentencing judges.
Before the PROTECT Act, a district court's decision to choose a
sentence that departed from the range recommended by the Sentencing
Guidelines was to be given considerable deference by courts of appeals. In
accordance with the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Koon v. United
States,5 appellate courts had been directed to review Guideline departures
for "abuse of discretion.",6 But the PROTECT Act's "Feeney Amendment,"
named after its author, Florida Representative Tom Feeney, changed the
1. 338 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2003), withdrawn, 358 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2004). The original opinion
is no longer available in the Federal Reporter but can be found on the Lexis database. See United
States v. Thurston, Nos. 02-1966, 02-1967, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15516 (1st Cir. Aug. 4, 2003).
All subsequent citations to the withdrawn opinion rely on the Lexis text.
2. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, 42,
and 47 U.S.C.).
3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2003).
4. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (to be codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, 42, and 47
U.S.C.).
5. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
6. The circuit courts varied in their interpretations of Koon: Most relied on the case to give
considerable deference to departure decisions, but others interpreted it more narrowly. See
Michael Goldsmith & Marcus Porter, Lake Wobegon and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: The
Problem of Disparate Departures, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 72-73 (2000); see also Ian
Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion: Koon's Failure To Recognize
the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Under the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV. 493, 526-27 (1999).
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standard of review to "de novo," and seemingly invited appellate courts to
regularly second-guess the sentences imposed by district judges. The
Amendment, which was approved after just fifteen minutes of debate on the
floor of the House of Representatives, 7 quickly earned the condemnation of
nearly the entire legal community.8 Until Thurston, however, courts of
appeals around the country had danced around the new standard of review,
asserting in case after case that their decisions would be the same using
either de novo or abuse-of-discretion review. 9 The First Circuit, which in
the past had often led other courts of appeals when it came to sentencing
decisions,' ° tackled the new law head-on in Thurston.
In December 2001, a Massachusetts jury found William Thurston, the
vice president of a drug-testing company, guilty of conspiring to defraud
the Medicare program of over five million dollars. A direct application of
the range prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines would have given
Thurston a prison sentence of between sixty-three and seventy-eight
months. But Judge Harrington was moved by Thurston's extensive service
to his community and was troubled by the light sentence given to the
company's president (who had pled nolo contendere to the same crime). So
Judge Harrington departed from the Guideline range and sentenced
Thurston to just three months' incarceration, with a recommendation for
community confinement." The government appealed, and by the time the
First Circuit heard the case, the Feeney Amendment had become law.
In a comprehensive, twenty-five-page opinion issued on August 4,
2003, the Thurston panel exercised its new deference-free powers of review
and rejected both of Judge Harrington's reasons for departing from the
Guidelines, remanding with instructions to the judge to impose the statutory
maximum sentence of sixty months. 2 Two months later, Judge Harrington
7. See Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 310, 313
(2003).
8. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 353 F.3d 1154, 1157 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
72 U.S.L.W. 3599 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2004); United States v. Carter, 71 Fed. Appx. 210, 211 n.*
(4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (unpublished decision); United States v. Semsak, 336 F.3d 1123,
1125 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1161 (2004); United States v. Camejo, 333 F.3d 669,
675 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Tarantola, 332 F.3d 498, 500 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 855 (2003).
10. The First Circuit's early sentencing leadership was due in part to the presence of
then-Judge Breyer, who had served as one of the original commissioners of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission. The First Circuit's decisions in United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43
(1st Cir. 1989), and United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1993), have been cited
extensively by other circuit courts for their approaches to the Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g.,
United States v. Broderson, 67 F.3d 452, 458 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Rivera, 994 F.2d at 948-49);
United States v. Gonzales, 929 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at
49). Judge Breyer served on the Diaz- Villafane panel and wrote the opinion in Rivera.
11. See United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing Judge
Harrington's reasons for departing).
12. United States v. Thurston, Nos. 02-1966, 02-1967, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15516, at *74
(1st Cir. Aug 4, 2003), withdrawn, 358 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2004). In this case, the statutory
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formally refused to do so. "The Court recuses itself from this case," he
wrote. "It is disinclined to mechanically impose a sentence, previously
prescribed by the Court of Appeals, which is clearly contrary to the
objective of the sentencing guidelines."' 3 In a footnote, echoing a widely
held feeling among judges across the country, 14 Judge Harrington added:
The newly granted authority given the Court of Appeals under
the Protect Act to review de novo a departure decision renders the
trial judge superfluous and with only a nominal function at
disposition. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the trial judge
possesses deep understanding of the case based on knowledge
acquired from presiding at two complex criminal jury trials.15
The purpose of this Note is to suggest that despite Judge Harrington's
comments-and the doomsday rhetoric of much of the legal community-
departure decisions should be reviewed de novo by the courts of appeals.
The "abuse of discretion" standard for reviewing Guideline departures is, I
argue, a relic of the pre-Guidelines regime in which judges were
authorized-and expected-to consider each offender holistically and base
their decisions on any available information, including the individual's
character, upbringing, and family life. 16 Only the sentencing judge is
situated to conduct this kind of open-ended inquiry, making deferential
review on appeal appropriate. For better or worse, however, the enactment
of the Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 fundamentally changed the essence of
the sentencing decision from an exercise of wide-ranging discretion to an
application of carefully delineated rules by which offenders are placed in
categories rather than treated as individuals.
Under the Guidelines, once the facts of a given case are established, the
decision to depart from a prescribed range requires determining what the
Guidelines mean-what types of offenses and offenders the Guidelines are
and are not intended to cover. This is, at its essence, a legal assessment that
appellate courts are at least as capable of making as district courts.
maximum-sixty months-was lower than the range recommended by the Guidelines (sixty-three
to seventy-eight months). If a judge chooses not to depart downward from the Guidelines when
they exceed a statutory cap, the offender is sentenced to the statutory maximum. See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Gl.1 (2003).
13. United States v. Thurston, 286 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72 (D. Mass. 2003) (Harrington, J.)
(citation omitted).
14. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
15. Thurston, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 72 n.4 (Harrington, J.) (citation omitted). The two trials that
Judge Harrington mentioned are of Thurston, who was convicted, and of Gerald Cullen, the
drug-testing company's senior vice president for operations, who was acquitted. Id. at 71-72.
16. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("A sentencing judge ... is not
confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to
determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly
relevant-if not essential-to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.").
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Appellate courts may in fact be better-suited to make these determinations:
Not only are they more accustomed to looking at case law across districts
and circuits, ensuring more consistent nationwide application of the
Guidelines, but they also enjoy the benefit of input from a panel of judges,
as well as from the judge below. More importantly, only appellate courts
can bring uniformity to normative judgments about the Guidelines'
meanings-judgments that form the core of decisions to depart.
The Feeney Amendment's de novo standard of review recognizes these
comparative institutional competencies. De novo review also has the benefit
of forcing appellate courts to grapple directly with the structure and
application of the Guidelines and the purposes of sentencing, as opposed to
simply setting boundaries around district court decisionmaking. The courts
of appeals, armed with the power of de novo review, have the opportunity
to create a principled common law of sentencing departures that can fill the
considerable gaps in the existing Guidelines regime.
Part I of this Note provides the background for my analysis, describing
the history of appellate review of sentencing decisions from the pre-
Guidelines regime through the enactment of the Feeney Amendment. Part II
describes why de novo review is the appropriate standard for evaluating
Guideline departures, given the purposes and structure of the Sentencing
Reform Act, the Guidelines, and the Feeney Amendment. Part III explains
why, as a matter of policy, we should embrace greater appellate
involvement in sentencing. Part IV addresses the primary justifications that
judges and scholars have given in support of the Koon abuse-of-discretion
standard. Part V revisits the circumstances of Thurston to show what de
novo review looks like in practice (and why it may not be so dangerous
after all).
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
A. Before the Guidelines
Until 1987, district court judges had enormous discretion to tailor
criminal sentences as they saw fit. Judge Marvin Frankel, whose book
Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order helped bring about the Guidelines
regime, decried the "almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers" given
to sentencing judges-a system that he called "terrifying and intolerable for
a society that professes devotion to the rule of law."'17 When determining a
sentence, district court judges were instructed to consider not just the crime
committed and the offender's relevant criminal history, but also the
17. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972).
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offender's whole life and character. 18 Professor Kevin Reitz notes that
"[w]ith such a free-form thought process in gear, there were effectively no
legal principles against which a sentence could be tested on review."'
' 9
As a result, so long as sentences fell within the (typically broad) ranges
prescribed by statute, just about any sentence issued by a district court
judge, for whatever reason, was likely to survive appeal.2 ° Judges rarely
explained their sentences, and consequently sentencing decisions were
made with little or no guidance from case law.21 The few appellate
decisions that did exist mostly dealt not with substantive analysis of the
purposes and principles underlying sentencing, but with constitutional
issues such as whether the penalty constituted cruel and unusual
punishment or whether the sentencing procedures violated due process.22
B. The Early Guidelines Regime
Then came the revolution. Spurred on by outrage over perceived
disparities in sentencing across the country,2 3 Congress passed the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and enacted the Sentencing Guidelines in
1987. Suddenly the vast majority of sentences were not up to the discretion
of individual judges, but instead were dictated by simple application of an
exhaustive set of rules.
Take, for example, the federal bank robbery statute, which prescribes a
maximum prison sentence of ten years for nonviolent robberies of more
than $100.24 Before the Guidelines, a judge had discretion to sentence
someone who stole, say, $500,000 from a federally insured bank to
anywhere from zero to ten years' imprisonment. Under the new regime,
however, a sentencing judge must engage in a series of detailed calculations
using numeric values assigned by the Guidelines. The judge must determine
the "base offense level" (which for nonviolent bank robbery is six), add the
number of levels corresponding to the amount stolen (fourteen for a "loss"
between $400,001 and $1,000,000), and apply any further adjustments
commanded by the Guidelines (if the robbery employed "sophisticated
18. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison
of Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1445 (1997).
19. Id.
20. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) ("[O]nce it is determined that
a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate
review is at an end."); see also Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1688 (1992).
21. See Freed, supra note 20, at 1688.
22. See Reitz, supra note 18, at 1443.
23. See FRANKEL, supra note 17, at 4-6; see also KATE STITH & JOSt A. CABRANES, FEAR
OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 104 (1998).
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (2000).
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means," for example, two more levels would be added). Then the judge,
using the "Sentencing Table, 26 must cross-reference the offense-level total
with the offender's "criminal history category," which involves an equally
detailed calculation based on the defendant's prior criminal record.27
Assuming this was our hypothetical bank robber's first offense, his criminal
history would fall in Category 1,28 resulting in a prescriptive Guideline
range of between thirty-three and forty-one months' imprisonment. 29 Had
the defendant been given the two-point "sophisticated means" adjustment,
his range would be forty-one to fifty-one months.30 The sentencing statute
stipulates that the maximum sentence within a Guideline range shall not
exceed the minimum by the greater of six months or twenty-five percent. 31
While called "guidelines," the ranges dictated by the Sentencing Table
are presumptive, unless a judge can find a reason to "depart., 32 The purpose
of departures was to give judges the freedom to adjust sentences in those
unusual cases in which the underlying circumstances differ from the
assumptions that shaped the Guidelines. 33 Departures, however, are limited
to situations in which "the court finds that there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission."34 Deciding to depart thus
requires analyzing the Sentencing Manual to divine what the Sentencing
Commission did and did not adequately consider. This is no straightforward
task, especially given the litany of undefined terms in the Guidelines and
the lack of guidance from the Commission as to what "adequately taken
into consideration" actually means.
In drafting the Guidelines, the Commission was unable to resolve the
tensions among the competing purposes of sentencing (deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, retribution), nor did it favor one purpose over
the others.35 Instead, the Commission based the original Guidelines largely
on past sentencing practice, using an in-depth analysis of 10,500 sentences
25. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2003).
26. Id. ch. 5, pt. A.
27. Seeid. §§ 4A1.1-.2.
28. See id. § 4A1.1; id. ch. 5, pt. A.
29. See id. The defendant's "offense level," absent special adjustments derived from the
particular circumstances of the crime, would be 6 + 14 = 20.
30. See id. The defendant's "offense level" would be 6 + 14 + 2 = 22.
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2000). If, however, the lower end of the Guideline range is a
sentence of thirty years' imprisonment or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment. Id.
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
33. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. K. Some evidence suggests that, in
passing the Feeney Amendment, Congress may have wrongly believed that departures constituted
violations of the Guidelines. For example, the House Conference Report on the Feeney
Amendment refers to the prevalence of "illegal" downward departures. PROTECT ACT,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 108-66, at 59 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 694.
34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
35. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 23, at 53.
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imposed in the federal courts in 1985 and a less detailed analysis of nearly
100,000 additional cases to determine both the relevant factors that
distinguish offenders and crimes and the appropriate severity of sentences.
36
But the rules crafted as a result of this analysis were not accompanied by
substantive explanations. The Commission did not describe the cases it
relied on to create each Guideline rule, nor did it explain the process by
which it arrived at a given rule.37 As Professor Ronald Wright notes,
"While most rulemaking agencies provide thorough explanations of their
final rules, including the factual evidence supporting the rule, and respond
to important comments from opponents, the commission's explanations for
its final Guidelines are strikingly terse and conclusory.,, 38 Professor Kate
Stith and Judge Jos& Cabranes, two leading Guidelines scholars, explain
that, as a result, "courts are often without information regarding the
underlying policies or objectives that the Commission is seeking to achieve
through its sentencing rules."39
Despite the opacity of their underlying meaning, however, the new
rules opened the door to appellate review of sentences. When district courts
departed from the Guidelines, they were required to state their reasons in
open court,4° giving appellate courts a tool to evaluate the justification for
any departure. Moreover, the original sentencing statute commanded courts
of appeals to determine whether sentences that were "outside the applicable
guideline range" were "unreasonable" (without, of course, defining
"unreasonable"). 41
Adding to the confusion were the conflicting signals Congress gave as
to just how extensive this appellate review should be. On the one hand,
Congress suggested that courts of appeals should use their powers of review
to "promote fairness and rationality," "reduce unwarranted disparity,"
"provide case law development" of sentencing departures, and "assist the
Sentencing Commission in refining the sentencing guidelines as the need
arises., 42 Such directives would seem to require active appellate
involvement in sentencing, and possibly de novo review of departures. On
the other hand, Congress wanted "to preserve the concept that the discretion
of a sentencing judge has a proper place in sentencing and should not be
36. See id. at 59.
37. See id. at 57, 94-95.
38. Ronald F. Wright, Amendments in the Route to Sentencing Reform, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
Winter/Spring 1994, at 58, 64 (citation omitted).
39. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 23, at 56.
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000), amended by PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21,
§ 40 1(c), 117 Stat. 650, 669 (2003).
41. See id. § 3742(e)(3), amended by PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-2 1, § 401(d)(1),
117 Stat. 650, 670 (2003).
42. COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1983, S. REP. No. 98-225, at 150-51 (1983),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3332, 3333-34.
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displaced by the discretion of an appellate court. 43 Accordingly, the SRA
directed courts of appeals to "give due regard to the opportunity of the
district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and [to] accept the
findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. 44
And in 1988, Congress added a requirement that courts of appeals "give
due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the
facts."4 5 Thus, while Congress wanted appellate courts to control and guide
sentencing discretion, it left open the question of what standard of review
appellate courts should employ when evaluating departures.46
One of the first cases to provide an in-depth analysis of the appropriate
standard for reviewing Guideline departures came in 1989, when the First
Circuit decided United States v. Diaz-Villafane.47 Wilfredo Diaz-Villafane,
a first-time offender, pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute
twenty grams of heroin.48 The sentencing range prescribed by the
Guidelines was twenty-seven to thirty-three months' imprisonment. But
because the district court determined that, among other things, Diaz-
Villafane was an "important supplier" and had employed minors in his
dealing scheme, it departed upward and sentenced him to 120 months in
prison.49 On appeal, the First Circuit applied an analysis from which this
Note has liberally borrowed: It gave deference to the district court's
findings of fact but exercised de novo review of the, determination that the
case was sufficiently "unusual" to justify departure. As Judge Selya
explained, "That review is essentially plenary: whether or not
circumstances are of a kind or degree that they may appropriately be relied
upon to justify departure is, we think, a question of law.",50 The panel then
upheld the sentencing court's departure.
Diaz- Villafane's de novo standard of review was widely adopted
by other federal circuits,51 much to the dismay of many judges and
43. Id. at 150, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3333.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), amended by PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d), 117 Stat.
650, 670-71 (2003).
45. Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7103(a)(7), 102 Stat. 4181, 4417 (amending
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)).
46. This ambiguity led to a split in circuits which was later resolved by Koon. Compare
United States v. Kaye, 23 F.3d 50, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1994) (employing "strict de novo review"), and
United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that plenary review of
the decision to depart is appropriate), with United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 908 (7th Cir.
1994) ("[W]hen a district court clearly explains the basis for its finding of an extraordinary family
circumstance, that finding is entitled to considerable respect on appeal.").
47. 874 F.2d 43.
48. Id. at 45.
49. See id. at 48.
50. Id. at 49.
51. See Reitz, supra note 18, at 1467. Professor Reitz argues that the decision led to
"spectacles of dueling discretion between the trial and appellate courts," in which appellate courts
would tell district courts that while the factor they were considering was relevant, it wasn't
unusual enough to warrant a departure. Id. at 1467-68.
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scholars. 52 Perhaps in reaction to the criticism, the First Circuit modified its
Diaz-Villafane standard in 1993 in United States v. Rivera.53 Then-Chief
Judge Breyer, who had served on the Sentencing Commission, held that the
determination of what is "unusual" does not merit plenary review (as the
Diaz-Villafane court had held), but rather merits some degree of deference.
Breyer noted that in many instances,
the district court's decision... will not involve a "quintessentially
legal" interpretation of the words of a guideline, but rather will
amount to a judgment about whether the given circumstances, as
seen from the district court's unique vantage point, are usual or
unusual, ordinary or not ordinary, and to what extent. A district
court may well have a special competence in making this kind of
determination, because it may have a better "feel" for the unique
circumstances of the particular case before it.
5 4
As I explain in Parts II and IV, this analysis of the district court's
"unique vantage point" misinterprets the nature of Guideline review. Three
years after Rivera, however, the Supreme Court in Koon v. United States
expanded on the concept of sentencing courts' "special competence," and
officially removed, until the Feeney Amendment, the possibility of de novo
appellate review altogether.
C. The Koon Decision
Koon dealt with the sentencing of two Los Angeles police officers,
Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell, who had participated in the 1991
beating of Rodney King. In April 1992, the officers were found not guilty
of all charges in state court; the acquittals led to the worst rioting in Los
Angeles history.55 A year later, Koon and Powell were convicted in federal
court of violating King's constitutional rights. District Judge Davies
determined that a direct application of the range prescribed by the
Guidelines would have resulted in a prison sentence of seventy to eighty-
52. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 918 F.2d 1268, 1276 (6th Cir. 1990) (Ryan, J.,
concurring) ("The Diaz-Villafane formula all but reads out of the sentence review process
appropriate deference to the trial court's logic, experience, wisdom, and unique insight into the
case as they are to be applied in the complex art of criminal sentencing. .... [I]t attempts to make
science of what is art."); Reitz, supra note 18.
53. 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1993). The opinion by the First Circuit actually consolidated two
cases-United States v. Rivera and United States v. Adamo-into a single opinion, expressly to
offer guidance to other courts. It explained that "doing so may help to illustrate an appropriate
legal analysis for 'departures."' Id. at 946.
54. Id. at 951 (Breyer, C.J.).
55. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 88 (1996) ("More than 40 people died .... more
than 2,000 were injured, and nearly $1 billion in property was destroyed.").
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seven months.56 But Judge Davies granted two downward departures. The
first was due to "Mr. King's wrongful conduct," which "contributed
significantly to provoking the offense behavior"; the second was based on a
combination of factors, including that the officers were "significantly
burden[ed]" by having been subjected to successive state and federal
prosecutions, and that the officers were not "violent" people.57 As a result
of the departures, Judge Davies sentenced Koon and Powell to thirty
months in prison-nearly three-and-a-half years' less time than the
Guidelines recommended.58
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the officers'
convictions but, using a de novo standard of review, reversed the departures
and remanded the case for resentencing.59 The Supreme Court then reversed
all but two minor aspects of the Ninth Circuit's opinion, holding that courts
of appeals should review departure decisions solely for abuse of
discretion. 6° Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, tried to
explain away the revolutionary change brought about by the Sentencing
Guidelines: "It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial
tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an
individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that
sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to
ensue."
61
Justice Kennedy asserted that district courts have "an institutional
advantage" over appellate courts in making departure determinations
because they "see so many more Guidelines cases. ' 62 He also dismissed the
idea that appellate review of departures could contribute to a common law
of sentencing: "[A] district court's departure decision involves the
consideration of unique factors that are little susceptible... of useful
generalization."
63
56. United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 785 (C.D. Cal. 1993), affd in part, vacated in
part, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 518 U.S. 81.
57. Id. at 785-92.
58. Id. at 792. Interestingly, thirty months is about the amount of time to which Koon and
Powell would have been sentenced under the old Parole Commission guidelines. Interview with
Dennis Curtis, Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School, in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 4, 2004).
59. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416.
60. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98-100. Several scholars have pointed out, however, that despite the
Court's holding, it actually employed an exacting standard of review in assessing the departures.
See, e.g., Kate Stith, The Hegemony of the Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 14,
14(1996).
61. Koon, 518 U.S. at 113 (Kennedy, J.). Kennedy also wrote that, even after the Guidelines,
"the district court retains much of its traditional discretion." Id. at 98.
62. Id. at 98.
63. Id. at 99 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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D. The Feeney Amendment
In spring of 2003, seven years after the Supreme Court trumped the
Ninth Circuit in Koon, Congress fired back and passed the most sweeping
changes in the sentencing regime since the enactment of the Guidelines.64
In lobbying for the Feeney Amendment, Jamie Brown, the Acting Assistant
Attorney General, told legislators: "The consistency, predictability, and
toughness that Congress sought to achieve in the Sentencing Reform
Act... is being undermined by steadily increasing downward
departures. 65 In truth, these concerns were vastly overblown.66 Yet despite
the evidence-and extensive last-minute lobbying by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 67 the Sentencing Commission,68 and the
American Bar Association 69 -Congress followed the Justice Department's
lead.
64. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 18, 28, 42, and 47 U.S.C.).
65. Letter from Jamie E. Brown, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Orrin G.
Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 4, 2003), in Letter from Justice Department
Supporting Original Feeney Amendment, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 355, 356 (2003).
66. Although the number of downward departures has increased in recent years, this increase
has been due primarily to departures granted as a result of motions by the government (given for
cooperating with authorities and to expedite disposition of immigration cases in the southwest
border districts). In fiscal year 2001, 54,851 offenders whose sentences the Sentencing
Commission had enough data to analyze were sentenced under the Guidelines, and 19,416 of
these were awarded downward departures. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 53 tbl.26 (2002) [hereinafter 2001 SOURCEBOOK]. Of these
departures, nearly 6000 were granted in the five southwest border districts (the Southern District
of California, the Districts of Arizona and New Mexico, and the Western and Southern Districts of
Texas). This represents more than a 300% increase since 1991. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES 64 (2003) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE CONGRESS]. In addition, 9390 departures
were granted for cooperation with authorities. 2001 SOURCEBOOK, supra, at 53 tbl.26. But neither
the southwest "fast track" departures nor those granted for substantial assistance were targeted by
the Feeney Amendment. See Vinegrad, supra note 7, at 314. Excluding these government-initiated
departures, the actual departure rate in 2001 was in the vicinity of 10%, a substantially lower rate
than the 20% that Congress expected when creating the Guidelines regime. See COMPREHENSIVE
CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1983, S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52 n.71 (1983). Furthermore, the
government appealed only 25 sentencing departures in 2001. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra,
at 54-55. The circuit courts reversed the departures in 19 of these cases. Id.
67. See Letters to Congress from Sentencing Commissioners, Judicial Conference and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 341, 343 (2003) [hereinafter Letters to Congress]
(reprinting a letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference of the United
States, to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
68. See Letters to Congress, supra note 67, at 341 (reprinting a letter from Diane E. Murphy,
Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission, et al. to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, and Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Committee
on the Judiciary).
69. See Materials from Interested Groups Opposing Original Feeney Amendment, 15 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 346, 347 (2003) (reprinting Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President,
American Bar Association, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary).
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The Feeney Amendment targeted downward departures by, among
other things, severely limiting the ability of judges to depart from the
Guidelines in cases involving child crimes and sexual offenses;70 reducing
the number of judges serving on the Sentencing Commission;7 I and, in what
several judges have called an attempt to create a judicial "blacklist," 72
requiring the Commission to release data files containing judge-specific
sentencing information to the Attorney General.73
Mixed in with these anti-judge provisions, however, were two
requirements that could actually fix some of the longstanding problems of
the Guidelines regime. First, the Amendment required district judges to
state the reasons for any departure "with specificity in the written order of
judgment., 74 Before Feeney, judges were permitted to explain their
departures orally. This change, which will create the first comprehensive
body of sentencing case law easily accessible to judges and the
Commission, is vital to the advent of meaningfil appellate review and the
creation of a common law of sentencing departures. Second, the
Amendment overturned Koon's abuse-of-discretion standard of review. In
its place, Congress directed appellate courts, in examining departures, to
"review de novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the
facts. ' 75 The remainder of this Note explains why this change is so
important.
70. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §401(a), 117 Stat. 650, 667-68 (2003)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000)).
71. See id. § 401(n), 117 Stat. at 675-76 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)).
72. See Ian Urbina, New York's Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2003, at B 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. See PROTECT Act § 401(h), 117 Stat. at 672 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(4)).
74. Id. § 401(c), 117 Stat. at 669-70 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)) (emphasis added).
75. Id. § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. at 670 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that the Feeney Amendment's de novo standard does
not apply to appellate review of all departure determinations. See United States v. Bell, 351 F.3d
672, 675-76 (5th Cir. 2003). The court noted that the Feeney Amendment's command to "review
de novo" applies only to determinations under subsections (3)(A) and (3)(B) of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3742(e). Subsection (3)(A) refers to the district court's failure to provide a written statement of
reasons if it departs, and subsection (3)(B) mandates that courts of appeals should determine
whether "the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on a factor that-(i) does
not advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2); or (ii) is not authorized under section
3553(b); or (iii) is not justified by the facts of the case." The court asserted that these provisions
suggest that so long as the district court issues a written statement of reasons when it departs and
bases its departure on at least one objective listed in § 3553(a)(2) (which mentions deterrence,
incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation), the command to review de novo does not apply.
See id. at 676. But the Fifth Circuit was able to reach its conclusion only by ignoring subsection
(B)(iii), which requires courts of appeals to determine whether the sentence departs from the
guidelines based on a factor that "is not justified by the facts of the case." I fail to see how this
clause can refer to anything less than all departures. Furthermore, the court seemed to suggest that
so long as the district court's sentence served a single purpose of sentencing, it had met the
requirements of subsection B(i). But the statute uses the plural "objectives," suggesting that courts
of appeals must ensure that departures comport with the objectives of sentencing considered as a
whole.
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The judiciary has expressed nearly uniform outrage over the Feeney
Amendment,76 and while much of the ire has been directed at the
Amendment's "blacklist" features, its de novo provision also has been
roundly criticized. The Judicial Conference, in lobbying against the
Amendment, wrote that abuse-of-discretion review "recognizes that district
judges are better positioned to decide departures. 77 Lawrence Zatkoff,
Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Michigan, used his September 2003
State of the Court message to explain his opposition to de novo review.
Imposing a sentence, he said,
is the most difficult part of my job because of the man or woman
and their family members who are standing before me awaiting
sentence. That individual is not a simple mathematical equation,
and not a formula to be calculated.... The sentencing judge alone
is in the best position to consider the totality of the defendant's
situation.78
Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York has begun
videotaping all of his sentencing proceedings so that the court of appeals,
when exercising de novo review, will be able to see the defendant as a
person, not just a paper record.79
Amid all of the criticism of the Feeney Amendment, it is easy to lose
sight of a critical fact: The version of the Amendment that was signed into
law still leaves considerable room for sentencing departures. In its original
form, the Amendment aimed to limit all downward departures to those
"affirmatively and specifically identified as a permissible ground of
downward departure in the sentencing guidelines or policy statements. ' 8°
76. See Alan Vinegrad, The Judiciary's Response to the PROTECT Act, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 8,
2004, at 4. Chief Justice Rehnquist devoted a substantial part of his 2003 year-end report on the
judiciary to decrying the Amendment. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2003 YEAR-END REPORT
ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2004), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/
2003year-endreport.html. In addition, several judges have used their sentencing opinions to speak
out against the Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Mellert, No. CR 03-0043 MHP, 2003 WL
22025007, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2003) ("[T]he wisdom of the years and breadth of experience
accumulated by judges and the Sentencing Commission in adjudicating criminal cases and
sentencing defendants is shucked for the inexperience of young prosecutors and the equally young
think-tank policy makers in the legislative and executive branches.").
77. Letters to Congress, supra note 67, at 343 (reprinting a letter from Leonidas Ralph
Mecham to Senator Orrin G. Hatch). After the passage of the PROTECT Act, the Judicial
Conference noted that the "alteration of the standard of review" was "contrary to previous
positions" taken by the Conference, but did not specifically call for the provision's repeal. See
Judicial Conference Seeks Restoration of Judges' Sentencing Authority, THIRD BRANCH, Oct.
2003, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/oct03ttb/restoration/index.htmi.
78. Lawrence P. Zatkoff, Message on the State of the Court (Sept. 16, 2003), in E. Dist. of
Mich. Chapter, Fed. Bar Ass'n, Thoughts on the Role of the Federal Judiciary, at
http://www.fbamich.org/index.cfm?location=138&ParentlD=l (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
79. See Leonard Post, Two U.S. Judges Fire at 'Feeney,'NAT'L L.J., Feb. 9, 2004, at 4.
80. 149 CONG. REC. H2420 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003).
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But in conference committee, this ban on unspecified downward departures
was limited to child crimes and sexual offenses,8' allowing courts to retain
the bulk of their departure authority. Senator Edward Kennedy explained
that the Amendment was not "intended to discourage departure decisions
when the unusual circumstances of a case justify a sentence outside the
recommended range. 81
Therefore, despite several provisions that judges and scholars are
rightly alarmed by, the Feeney Amendment cannot be construed as an all-
out assault on downward departures. As I argue below, the discretion to
depart preserved in the Amendment, coupled with the proper and
enlightened exercise of de novo review, has the potential to bring greater
justice and wisdom to sentencing determinations.
II. How DE Novo REVIEW FITS THE CURRENT
STRUCTURE OF THE GUIDELINES
A. Is Sentencing Unique?
To begin the analysis, it is worth asking why sentencing has always
been considered different from torts and contracts, fields that have
engendered the creation of a common law (and have welcomed de novo
review). Professor Stith and Judge Cabranes explain that sentencing has
traditionally been considered unique because it is the one area of law in
which justice's "blindfold" is meant to be lifted.83 When a court decides
guilt or innocence (or, for that matter, whether an individual is civilly liable
or has breached a contract), "it ought not to matter whether the defendant is
rich or poor, whether the defendant has erred in the past, or suffered
unusual disadvantages. ''84 But in sentencing, "Justicia must lift the
blindfold,, 85 for the judge is required to consider the whole individual, "to
weigh all of the circumstances of the particular case. 86 This dichotomy
helps to explain why few limits have traditionally existed as to what
evidence can be presented at sentencing hearings. In such a system, with no
standardized way of assessing "the whole person," it would be difficult to
have meaningful appellate review. Furthermore, evaluations that depend on
an endless number of variables are not, by their very nature, useful for
generalization. It is this system that the Koon Court seemed to be harkening
81. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(2) (West Supp. 2003).
82. 149 CONG. REC. S5119 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), cited in
Vinegrad, supra note 7, at 313.
83. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 23, at 78-79.
84. Id. at 78.
85. Id. at 79.
86. Id. at 78.
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back to when writing of the need to defer to the discretion of the district
judge.8 7
But this system ceased to exist with the enactment of the Guidelines. As
described in Section I.B, a sentencing decision now requires examining a
400-plus-page manual to determine which of forty-three "offense levels"
applies to a defendant and then cross-referencing that number with the
appropriate "criminal history category" to determine the appropriate
sentence range. 88 As Stith and Cabranes lament, "the case-by-case exercise
of human judgment" has been replaced by "a mechanical calculus., 89 A
crucial side effect of this revolutionary change was to remove the obstacles
to meaningful appellate review. Once a trial judge determines what the
relevant facts are, application of these facts to the Guidelines is primarily,
as the First Circuit concluded in Diaz-Villafane, a legal analysis to which
the trial judge brings no unique expertise.90
Defenders of abuse-of-discretion review point out that in certain places,
the sentencing statute commands judges to evaluate defendants using the
same "whole person" analysis judges employed in the pre-Guidelines era.91
Section 3553(a) directs courts to consider "the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant ' 92 as well as
the entire panoply of purposes for sentencing-from deterrence and
incapacitation to retribution and rehabilitation.93 And § 3661 states: "No
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of
the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence., 94 These clauses suggest that judges, even under the
Guidelines regime, should conduct the kind of open-ended inquiry that
occurred prior to the SRA and that precluded meaningful appellate review.
But appellate review is difficult only in situations in which the
Guidelines do not restrict or place boundaries around the use of the "whole
person" analysis. For example, a sentencing judge can use the wide-ranging
information gleaned from the inquiry conducted pursuant to § 3553(a) and
§ 3661 in choosing the length of a defendant's sentence within the specified
Guideline range. The Guidelines place no boundaries around such
decisions; accordingly, they typically do not face appellate scrutiny. The
discretionary "whole person" analysis also comes into play after a judge
87. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).
88. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2003).
89. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 23, at 82.
90. See United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1989).
91. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 20, at 1745; Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, Honoring
Judicial Discretion Under the Sentencing Reform Act, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 235 (1991).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2000).
93. See id. § 3553(a).
94. Id. § 3661.
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has decided to depart from the Guidelines, because the sentencing statute
places few restrictions (and provides little guidance) as to the extent of
departures. It is logical, therefore, that this decision, which the Diaz-Villafane court called "quintessentially a judgment call, '96 be given "due
deference" and reversed on appeal only if found to be unreasonable.97
B. Why the Departure Decision Invites Active Appellate Review
However, the decision of whether to depart at all-the central subject
of the Feeney Amendment and this Note's inquiry-receives fundamentally
different treatment by the Guidelines and the sentencing statute, both of
which spell out in detail the factors that judges are permitted to consider in
making a departure determination. Section 5K2.0 of the Guidelines
authorizes the sentencing court to depart from the applicable Guideline
range when the court finds "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance," so long as that circumstance is "of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that, in order to advance the objectives set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), should result in a sentence different from that
described." 98
To break this down, for a court to depart from the range recommended
by the Guidelines, it must (1) examine the facts of the case to see if any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances exist; (2) determine what has been
"adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission" by
examining "only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary of the Sentencing Commission.; 99 and (3) consider the
purposes of sentencing listed in § 3553(a)(2) to determine whether a
Guideline sentence is justified.
The first part of this analysis is a factual assessment that district courts
are uniquely qualified to make, as it requires weighing evidence presented
at trial, judging the credibility of witnesses, and assessing the testimony
given at the sentencing hearing. The second and third parts of the analysis,
95. See id. § 3553(b).
96. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (lst Cir. 1989).
97. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 37 4 2(e) (West Supp. 2003).
98. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §. 5K2.0 (2003). The objectives set forth in§ 3553(a)(2) are for the sentence
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The Feeney Amendment did not change this provision.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
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on the other hand, require examining the overall Guidelines regime and the
purposes of sentencing-and these are fundamentally legal determinations.
The departure decision, thus, is "the essence of a mixed question offact and
law."1
00
In establishing standards of review for other mixed questions of fact
and law, the Supreme Court has welcomed de novo review. In Ornelas v.
United States, which was decided just two weeks before Koon, the Supreme
Court, with only Justice Scalia in dissent, held that trial judges'
determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be
reviewed de novo on appeal.101 The Court explained that reasonable
suspicion and probable cause are "fluid concepts that take their substantive
content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being
assessed," and that a policy of deference, allowing individual judges to
determine the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "would be inconsistent
with the idea of a unitary system of law." 10 2 The Court added that "the legal
rules for probable cause and reasonable suspicion acquire content only
through application. Independent review is therefore necessary if appellate
courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles."1 °3 The
Court echoed these sentiments in 2001 when ruling that de novo review is
appropriate for analyzing a district court's ruling on the constitutional
excessiveness of a punitive damages award. 0 4 As I argue more fully in
Parts III and IV, the Court's reasoning in these cases applies with equal
force to sentencing: The content of the Sentencing Guidelines can only be
given meaning through application, their principles are sorely in need of
greater clarity, and allowing district judges too much discretionary leeway
enables similarly situated persons to be treated differently depending on
whose courtroom they happen to be in.
Importantly, the sentencing statute gives courts of appeals the tools to
conduct the kind of de novo review that would add meaning and clarity to
the Guidelines. Section 3742(e) requires the court of appeals, upon review
of the record, to determine whether the sentence "departs from the
applicable guideline range based on a factor that-(i) does not advance the
objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2); or (ii) is not authorized under
section 3553(b); or (iii) is not justified by the facts of the case."10 5 The
100. Freed, supra note 20, at 1735; see also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New "Sliding Scale of
Deference" Approach to Abuse of Discretion: Appellate Review of District Court Departures
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1997).
101. 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001)
(arguing that de novo review will "assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situated
persons," "clarify ... legal principles," and "unify precedent" (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
105. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West Supp. 2003).
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sentencing statute thus commands appellate courts in reviewing sentences
to consider the purposes of sentencing-first in considering the objectives
of § 3553(a)(2), and again in determining whether a sentence is "justified."
It is also worth noting that de novo review does not mean that no
deference is given to the first step of departure analysis-the step at which
the district court assesses aggravating or mitigating factors of a given case.
The Supreme Court has held that even under a de novo standard of review,
such findings of fact should be reviewed only for "clear error."' 10 6 It is the
second and third prongs of the departure decision-the district court's
determination of whether mitigating or aggravating factors were adequately
considered by the Commission and the court's assessment of the purposes
of sentencing as they relate to the circumstances of the case-that are given
plenary review.
C. Applying De Novo Review to the Three Types of Departures
The Guidelines Manual (as revised post-Feeney) describes three
different types of departure decisions: "identified" departures, in which the
grounds for departure are spelled out in the Manual; "unidentified"
departures, in which a circumstance not identified by the Guidelines
nonetheless makes the case so "exceptional" as to warrant departure; and
so-called "heartland" departures, which involve circumstances mentioned in
the Guidelines, but, given the facts of the case, were not "adequately taken
into consideration" by the Commission. 10 7 Professor Cynthia Lee suggests
that because each of these types of departures requires a fundamentally
different mode of analysis, each should be subject to a differing level of
appellate scrutiny. 108 I argue that the type of analysis outlined above, in
which courts of appeals give deference to the district court's factual
determinations but review de novo the legal aspects of the departure
decision, should apply equally to all three types of departures.
For "identified" departures, judges rely on the list of permissible
grounds for departure in subpart 5K2 of the Guidelines to determine
whether a sentence should fall outside the Guideline range. 109 For example,
section 5K2.8 ("Extreme Conduct") states that "[i]f the defendant's conduct
was unusually heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim, the court
may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the nature of
the conduct." In reviewing a 5K2.8 departure, a court of appeals should
give due deference to the district court's assessment of the facts, such as
whether the defendant taunted the victim while committing his crime. But
106. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699.
107. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2003).
108. See Lee, supra note 100, at 41-46.
109. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K2.1-.23.
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the court of appeals should review de novo whether those facts constitute
"heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading" conduct-because that is a legal
assessment of what the Guidelines mean and are intended to cover.
"Unidentified" departures, by their very nature, provide less guidance
as to appropriate factors to take into consideration. But even this type of
departure decision occurs within strict limits. The commentary to section
5K2.0 of the Guidelines notes that while "unidentified" departures are
permissible, "it is expected that departures based on such unidentified
circumstances will occur rarely and only in exceptional cases. ' 10 Similar to
the determination of whether a punitive damages award is "excessive," the
question of what is "exceptional" is fundamentally a legal analysis. It
requires determining: (1) whether the circumstances of the case truly were
not considered by the Sentencing Commission; and (2) whether the
circumstances are extraordinary enough to merit departure, given the
meaning and content of the entire Guidelines regime and the purposes of
sentencing. Once the factual circumstances are determined (which, again,
are given due deference), the remainder of this assessment is fundamentally
a legal one that appellate courts are as well-situated to make as are district
courts.
It is the third type of departure-"heartland" departures-that most
troubled the courts in Rivera and Koon. These involve: (1) circumstances
that were taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
establishing the Guidelines, but that are present in the offense "to a degree
substantially in excess of, or substantially below, that which ordinarily is
involved in that kind of offense";' or (2) offender characteristics that the
Guidelines define as "not ordinarily relevant" in determining departures,
but that are "present to an exceptional degree."' 1 2 In Rivera, then-Chief
Judge Breyer explained that heartland decisions involve determining
whether a case's circumstances "are usual or unusual, ordinary or not
ordinary, and to what extent."' 1 3 And since district judges see more
ordinary offenders and are closer to the case at hand, Breyer argued they are
better situated to determine what is and what is not usual. 1
4
But this is a misguided approach to heartland analysis in that it relies on
an unscientific survey of prior Guidelines cases. Paul Hofer and Mark
Allenbaugh, who have both served as staff members of the Sentencing
Commission, ask: "Do we really suppose that district judges see enough
civil rights, environmental, or tax cases to develop a sense of what the
110. Id. § 5K2.0 cmt. 3(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
111. Id. § 5K2.0(a)(3).
112. Id. § 5K2.0(a)(4).
113. United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993) (Breyer, CJ.).
114. Id.
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'typical' case looks like?"'1 5 Hofer and Allenbaugh argue that it makes no
sense to do a statistical analysis of past cases in order to determine a
guideline's heartland because few such cases may exist, different district
judges may come to different conclusions as to what is statistically typical,
and these conclusions may differ from what was intended by the Sentencing
Commission.' 16
Still, even if we were to accept this statistical method as the proper way
to make heartland determinations, de novo review would nevertheless be
appropriate. Once the sentencing judge has- made an assessment of the
relevant facts (determining what about the case at hand may or may not be
unusual), the departure decision requires an in-depth analysis of case law to
determine what is "typical." The relevant universe of cases for such an
analysis cannot be limited to the ones a given sentencing judge is familiar
with, for that would create the kind of sentencing inconsistencies the SRA
was designed to prevent. Rather, a proper analysis of relevant case law must
look at comparable cases across districts and circuits throughout the
country-an inquiry appellate courts are at least as well situated as district
courts to make.
The correct way to determine a guideline's heartland, argue Hofer and
Allenbaugh, is not through a statistical analysis using previous cases, but
instead by looking at the guideline's purpose. Courts, in accordance with
the commands of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), should use "legislative history,
guideline commentary, and other material," to discern the kind of cases the
guideline was intended to cover. 17 Once a court has defined the heartland,
it can then determine whether the facts of the case differ "substantially"
enough from the heartland to warrant departure. In this way, the task of
defining a guideline's heartland and applying it to the facts of a given case
is akin to deciding what constitutes "reasonable suspicion" or "probable
cause." These are fundamentally legal and normative determinations in
which district courts offer no special expertise and in which active appellate
review can help bring clarity and uniformity.
Thus, the structure of the sentencing statute and the Guidelines,
especially in the wake of the Feeney Amendment, suggests that de novo
review is the proper standard for courts of appeals to employ when
reviewing all departures from the Guidelines. Such a uniform standard has
the added benefit of bringing greater clarity to the process of review in a
way that Professor Lee's "sliding scale of deference"118 does not. In the
115. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using
the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 19, 81 (2003).
116. See id.
117. Id. at 80-82.
118. Lee, supra note 100, at 1.
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next Part, I argue that de novo review of sentencing departures also serves
two important public policy objectives.
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY BENEFITS OF DE Novo REVIEW
A. Forcing the Courts of Appeals To Engage with the Purposes of
Sentencing
One of the most significant flaws of the Guidelines regime has been the
unwillingness of courts at all levels to follow the sentencing statute's
mandate to analyze the purposes of sentencing in deciding each case. 19 A
more active posture of review might force appellate courts-and thereby
district courts-to grapple more fully with the sentencing process, as well
as the changes (and potential injustices) brought about by the Guidelines
regime. Koon's standard of deference has allowed appellate judges to hide
behind the decisions of district courts and avoid responsibility for Guideline
departures. It has also left district courts in the dark as to which departures
are genuinely acceptable. For example, in Thurston the defendant, trying to
win a departure based on his extensive service to the community, presented
the First Circuit with a series of cases in which departures for "good works"
had been granted by district courts and upheld by appellate courts. But the
first Thurston panel found these cases unpersuasive primarily because "the
circuit courts merely hold that there was no abuse of discretion."' 20 The
courts of appeals, in other words, had clean hands; it was the district judges
who had departed in each of these cases, and because their judgments were
given deference, there was no way of really knowing whether or not the
courts had properly interpreted the Guidelines. A de novo standard of
review would force appellate courts not only to decide on their own
whether the circumstances of a given case merit departure, but also to
articulate an analytic framework for deciding when departures are
appropriate.
That said, the general failure of the courts of appeals to contribute
meaningfully to sentencing law cannot be blamed entirely on the abuse-of-
discretion standard established by Koon in 1996. Prior to Koon, several
scholars detailed how some appellate courts had been using their review
powers to enforce compliance with narrow readings of the Guidelines rather
than to define acceptable avenues for departure. Professor Daniel Freed
argued that in the early years of the Guidelines, courts of appeals had acted
like "super-sentencing commissions," curtailing departures "as though it
119. See Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 115, at 78-80; see also infra text accompanying
notes 122-123.
120. United States v. Thurston, Nos. 02-1966, 02-1967, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15516, at *66
(lst Cir. Aug. 4, 2003), withdrawn, 358 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2004).
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was a sin to venture outside the guideline range." 121 Writing in 1992,
Professor Marc Miller made the equally disturbing observation that neither
district courts nor courts of appeals were considering the purposes of
sentencing in their judgments, despite the fact that the Sentencing Reform
Act mentions the purposes of sentencing eighteen times, 122 and § 3553(a)
and § 3742 command courts to consider the purposes of sentencing. Miller
wrote:
There are few model guideline sentencing decisions in which
courts have considered the extent to which each of the purposes of
sentencing applies to a kind of offense or offender. The lack of
such analysis seems due in equal measure to the Commission's
having discouraged judges from considering purposes, trial judges
ignoring the mandates of § 3553(a), and the rigid and restrictive
view of the judicial role taken by some federal courts of
appeals ....123
Koon's change in the standard of review had little effect on the dearth
of principled sentencing decisions. The few scholars who have examined
sentencing appeals in the wake of Koon point out that the above problems
have, if anything, gotten worse. Michael Goldsmith and Marcus Porter
write that after Koon, "chaos reigned," and that "[n]otwithstanding
predictions to the contrary, Koon did not produce significantly higher
affirmance rates of district court departure decisions., 124 Professor Barry
Johnson examined the different approaches of the circuit courts in the wake
of Koon and found that those circuits that afforded considerable deference
to district courts gave "the impression that departure review [was] purely ad
hoc," and "provide[d] no guidance at all to sentencing judges in future
cases." 
125
The Feeney Amendment's call for de novo review can be viewed as a
directive to bring order to such chaos. The benefit of de novo review is that
when appellate courts do grant departures, other courts will be given license
to follow their lead. This is why Mark Allenbaugh, in the course of blasting
the other provisions of the Feeney Amendment, stated that de novo review
might be the one provision worth saving: "Appellate courts now will be
forced to provide district court judges with more certain guidance on when
and to what degree departures are warranted. Consequently, de novo review
121. Freed, supra note 20, at 1747.
122. Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 413, 417 (1992).
123. Id. at 463.
124. Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 6, at 72 (footnote omitted).
125. Barry L. Johnson, Discretion and the Rule of Law in Federal Guidelines Sentencing:
Developing Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake of Koon v. United States, 58 OHIO ST. L.J.
1697, 1751 (1998).
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actually may work to liberate judges rather than constrain them when they
decide to depart."'' 2 6 Equally important, courts of appeals can use the
Feeney Amendment as an impetus to focus on § 3742(e) of the sentencing
statute and begin a much-needed conversation among courts about the
purposes of sentencing.
To be sure, the possibility exists that appellate courts will use their
enhanced review powers to curtail most or all departures, both to conserve
judicial resources and to avoid angering Congress. 127  But although
engaging in a principled analysis of departures (which the sentencing
statute mandates) would certainly bring some additional workload to the
federal appellate bench, the increase would likely be limited. In fiscal year
2001, of the more than 4000 sentencing cases heard by the courts of
appeals, just 359 involved appeals of departure decisions, only twenty-five
of which were brought by the government.1 28 It is difficult to imagine how
the courts of appeals will be overburdened by giving this limited number of
cases the kind of in-depth analysis they deserve. Whether the courts of
appeals will be cowed into submission by Congress is a more difficult
question. One hopes that appellate judges will keep in mind Senator
Kennedy's message that the version of the Feeney Amendment that passed
was not intended to eliminate departure decisions. Perhaps requiring courts
of appeals to take more responsibility for sentencing decisions will inspire
appellate judges to ensure that the sentences they review comport with the
objectives of sentencing.
B. The Development of a Common Law of Sentencing Departures
A second, related policy consideration is the need for a common law of
sentencing departures, the creation of which was one of the principal
justifications for the SRA's appellate review provisions. 29 But the
126. Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary? Why Congress' Fear of
Judicial Sentencing Discretion May Undermine a Generation of Reform, THE CHAMPION, June
2003, at 6, 11.
127. The swift passage of the Feeney Amendment leaves little doubt that Congress believes
courts grant too many departures. Indeed, the congressman who sponsored the Amendment
delivered a less-than-subtle critique after Minnesota District Judge Paul Magnuson issued an
opinion deeply critical of the Feeney Amendment, arguing that its purpose was to "intimidate and
threaten judges." United States v. Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1006 (D. Minn. 2003).
Representative Feeney responded by telling a public radio audience: "I would remind the judge
that he ought to get out the Constitution, where it's very clear that other than the United States
Supreme Court, all of the other federal courts are only established by the will of the United States
Congress." Judge Speaks Out Against Congress, Ashcroft (Minnesota Public Radio broadcast,
Oct. 22, 2003), http://news.mpr.org/features/2003/10/22_stawickiesentencing.
128. See REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 66, at 54-55; 2001 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
66, at 108-09 tbls.57-58.
129. See COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1983, S. REP. No. 98-225, at 150-51
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3332, 3333-34; see also Norval Morris, Towards
Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 284 (1977) (suggesting that appellate review is an
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development of a common law of sentencing departures has been stymied
in the past for three reasons: (1) Prior to the Feeney Amendment, district
courts could issue their reasons for departure orally and thus were not
required to provide the written records that form the basis for the
development of a common law; (2) deferential review has allowed
inconsistent, district-by-district definitions of key Guideline terms; 130 and
(3) appellate courts have taken a backseat to the rulemaking authority of the
Sentencing Commission.' 31 Professor Reitz notes that "because the circuit
courts have afforded such deference to the lawmaking choices of the
Commission, the appellate bench itself has forsworn any important
substantive lawmaking role."' 132 For the Guidelines to be administered
consistently and justly, this must change. The Commission continues to
provide neither legislative history nor comprehensive explanations of the
rules it promulgates. Nor does it list cases it sees as being within the
heartland of the various guidelines. As a result, many places in the
Guidelines remain unclear, undefined, or ambiguous, particularly in regard
to when departures are and are not appropriate. Without active involvement
of the courts of appeals, the role of filling in the gaps has been left to
district courts-a situation that necessarily leads to less uniformity in
sentencing.
In Koon, however, the Supreme Court suggested that there was no place
for common law development in sentencing departures because they
involve facts that are "'multifarious, fleeting, special, [and] narrow,'" and
require the 'consideration of unique factors that are little susceptible.., of
useful generalization."",133 This reasoning might have made sense under the
pre-Guidelines regime, in which sentencing determinations were so
case-specific that general rules would likely carry little meaning. But the
Guidelines have turned sentencing into a rule-based exercise, and it is
imperative for the courts of appeals to delineate what the rules are,
particularly when it comes to departure determinations, in which the
Sentencing Commission has provided little or no guidance. In Thurston, for
"obvious precondition of the evolutionary and principled development of a common law of
sentencing"). Professor Morris was an early proponent of sentencing reform who helped inspire
the creation of the Guidelines.
130. See Panel II: The Effects of Region, Circuit, Caseload and Prosecutorial Policies on
Disparity, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 165, 166 (2003).
131. See Reitz, supra note 18, at 1471.
132. Id.
133. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990)). A portion of the Court's analysis borrows from a 1971 law
review article that was not specifically intended to apply to sentencing. See Maurice Rosenberg,
Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 662 (1971)
("One of the 'good' reasons for conferring discretion on the trial judge is the sheer
impracticability of formulating a rule of decision for the matter in issue. Many questions that arise
in litigation are not amenable to regulation by rule because they involve multifarious, fleeting,
special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization .... ").
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example, one of Judge Harrington's departures was for "good works,"', 34
but what constitutes a good work? How do good works relate to the
language and structure of the sentencing statute or comport with the
purposes of sentencing? Moreover, in order to grant a heartland departure,
the Guidelines require courts to find the circumstances of any case
"exceptional," but even this basic term is not defined. 135
If a primary goal of the SRA is for sentencing to be consistent across
districts, each sentencing judge cannot be permitted to define these terms
herself. Rather, appellate courts must have the power to say what the law is,
not merely to define its outer boundaries. This is the same reason the
Supreme Court in Ornelas held that de novo review was appropriate for
probable cause determinations: De novo review allows appellate courts to
clarify legal principles and unify precedent. 136 In applying this rationale to
sentencing, the goal is to develop "a jurisprudential approach to those
occasions in which it is appropriate to set guideline presumptions aside."'
' 37
IV. THE HOLLOW ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AN ABUSE-OF-DISCRETION
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Given the structural and policy arguments I have spelled out in favor of
de novo review, it is worth considering whether compelling reasons exist
that weigh in favor of an abuse-of-discretion standard. In the twenty years
since the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, judges and scholars have
advanced three substantial justifications for why appellate courts should
defer to the judgments of their district court colleagues: (1) District judges,
because of their day-to-day experience with sentencing, know more than
appellate judges and are thus better equipped to make sentencing decisions;
(2) district judges are able to get a "feel" for an individual case in a way
that an appellate court, reviewing a paper trail, cannot; and (3) strong
appellate review would hurt the Sentencing Commission's ability to learn
from the judgments of district courts. This Part discusses why these
arguments do not outweigh the potential benefits of de novo review.
A. Greater Knowledge
In Rivera, then-Chief Judge Breyer explained his preference for a
deferential standard of review by noting that a district court is "likely to
have seen more ordinary Guidelines cases, for appellate courts hear only
134. United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 2004).
135. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a) (2003).
136. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996).
137. Reitz, supra note 18, at 1455.
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the comparatively few cases that counsel believe present a colorable
appeal. 138 Likewise, in Thurston, the Federal Defender Office submitted an
amicus curiae brief in support of Thurston's appeal, arguing that "district
court judges are far better informed about sentencing than are circuit
judges," and noting that Massachusetts district judges "attend sentencing
institutes [and] speak about sentencing at legal education programs."', 39
This theory-that district courts possess greater knowledge-is also
reflected in the scholarly literature on sentencing. 40 Professor Freed argues
that appellate courts should accord greater deference to the experience of
district courts in part because "[t]he appeals court is remote from the
universe of cases that make equality and proportionality in punishment,
across different defendants and crimes, issues of transcendent
importance."1
41
But while this argument might have been compelling in the early years
of the Guidelines, when most appellate judges had little to no experience
with sentencing, appellate courts now have seventeen years of reviewing
sentences under their belts. While it is true that more than 90% of
sentencing decisions each year do not get appealed, this still leaves more
than 4000 sentencing appeals a year.1 42 Professor Reitz notes that about
60% of all criminal appeals (including habeas and conviction appeals) are
sentencing appeals; "review of punishment decisions is now a more
frequent occurrence in the federal circuit courts than the review of all other
issues in criminal cases combined." 143 Also, because district judges do not
see many of any single type of departure case, their experience in
sentencing gives them no institutional advantage.144 Professor Ian
Weinstein points out that in one sense courts of appeals can bring more
knowledge to a case than can district courts, because appellate judges "have
the benefit of the views of the district judge and the other members of their
panels.9
1 45
Furthermore, while it is clear that many district judges know more
about sentencing than do appellate judges, the larger issue is whether this
makes any substantive difference. In countless circumstances in both
138. United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993) (Breyer, C.J.).
139. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Federal Defender Office and District of Massachusetts
Criminal Justice Act Board in Support of Defendant's Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing
En Banc at 6, Thurston (No. 03-1967).
140. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 20, at 1728; Lee, supra note 100, at 33.
141. Freed, supra note 20, at 1728.
142. See 2001 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at 53 tbl.26, 105 tbl.56. Of the 54,851 cases in
2001 for which the Commission had sufficient data, approximately 4200 were appealed. Id.
143. Reitz, supra note 18, at 1491. Of the 5807 criminal appeals heard by the circuit courts in
2001 (a number that excludes those for which the Commission had insufficient data), more than
4000 involved sentencing questions, whereas fewer than 3000 involved one or more
nonsentencing issues. See 2001 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 66, at 101 tbl.55.
144. See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 522.
145. Id.
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criminal and civil cases, a given trial judge will have greater expertise than
do the judges assigned to hear the case on appeal. Yet that doesn't mean
appellate judges must blindly defer to their more knowledgeable district
court colleagues. Rather, what matters is that appellate courts and trial
courts have access to the same tools and information necessary to render a
decision. In Thurston, the Federal Defender Office maintained that the
district court's critical advantage lay partly in a compendium of all
Massachusetts district court downward departures since the enactment of
the Guidelines. 46 Yet these data were available to both Judge Harrington
and the First Circuit panel. Furthermore, with the Feeney Amendment's
extensive reporting requirements, which force district courts to submit to
the Sentencing Commission every sentence issued along with a written
report explaining the reasons for any departures, 47 courts around the
country will now have unprecedented access to the departure decisions of
their colleagues.
In one sense, it could even be advantageous for an appellate court to
have less experience in criminal sentencing, so as to not be prejudiced by
personal experience. For even if heartland departures are based on what is
statistically "unusual" or "extraordinary," the relevant universe of typicality
extends beyond those cases a trial judge has seen during his or her tenure,
to all cases across the country. An appellate court may therefore be in a
better position to dispassionately evaluate the unusualness of a given case
by leaving personal experience out of the calculation and instead relying on
how courts around the country have dealt with similar issues.
B. Greater "Feel"
The second assertion made in favor of abuse-of-discretion review is
that district judges possess a superior "feel" for the case at hand and are
thereby in a better position to dispense genuine justice. Commentators
frequently cite a section of the Diaz- Villafane opinion to explain why this is
so: "District courts are in the front lines, sentencing flesh-and-blood
defendants. The dynamics of the situation may be difficult to gauge from
the antiseptic nature of a sterile paper record. Therefore, appellate review
must occur with full awareness of, and respect for, the trier's superior 'feel'
for the case. 148 Professor Freed further explains the gap between district
court and appellate court perspectives:
146. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Federal Defender Office and District of Massachusetts
Criminal Justice Act Board in Support of Defendant's Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing
En Banc, supra note 139, at 6.
147. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(w) (West Supp. 2003).
148. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1989).
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Appeals court judges are reviewers, opinion writers, and
rulemakers. They no longer look defendants in the eye, study
presentence reports, or struggle with assessing whether an offender
is beginning or ending a criminal career, appears to be dangerous or
harmless, is a minnow in a sea of big fish, or has gone astray under
unusually stressful circumstances and will not offend again.
Appellate judges no longer see large numbers of worried or stunned
faces, or multiple defendant cases covering the full range of
criminal responsibility.
149
Freed's analysis, however, brings us back to the question of under what
circumstances a court is permitted to rely on an open-ended evaluation of
the "whole person," for which it has a better feel. As discussed in Part II,
district courts have great leeway in choosing a sentence within the
Guideline range and, after the decision to depart has been made, the extent
of the departure. But the sentencing statute limits the degree to which
judges can rely on their feel of a case when making a departure decision.
On the one hand, a sentencing judge can (and should) rely on her superior
feel for the case in making the factual assessment of what about a case is
aggravating or mitigating. But the remainder of the departure inquiry is
confined to an analysis of the "guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary of the Sentencing Commission,"' 150 in which the feel of the
given case is not relevant. This is why the court's discussion of the "trier's
superior 'feel"' in Diaz- Villafane came not in its evaluation of the departure
decision itself, but only after that decision had been deemed appropriate, in
determining whether it was proper for the district court to depart upward so
severely.
In some situations, a sentencing judge may believe her feel for the case
is central to the decision to depart. In such cases, the judge can take steps to
ensure the appellate court understands why this is so. For example,
Massachusetts District Judge Gertner recently granted a good works
departure for a defendant's extraordinary contributions to his community.151
In her sentencing memorandum, she wrote that at the defendant's
sentencing hearing, "one hundred people filled the courtroom to
overflowing.. and returned for each of the three days (which
significantly, were not consecutive) no matter what the distances they had
to travel. 152 Judge Gertner wrote that she described the courtroom scene
"in order to give the reader-including any reviewing court-the kind of
data to which the First Circuit referred in United States v. Diaz-
149. Freed, supra note 20, at 1728.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
151. See United States v. Mehta, No. CRIM.01-10180-NG, 2004 WL 418119, at *1 (D.
Mass. Mar. 3, 2004) (Gertner, J.).
152. Id.
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Villafane."' 53 She added: "Unfortunately, I do not believe that my words
can do justice to the courtroom scene or the nature of the testimony.
Henceforth I will videotape the proceedings. 154 Judge Gertner's initiative
(following in Judge Weinstein's footsteps) should be applauded. However,
even in cases in which a district judge's written assessment of the factual
underpinnings of a departure may not fully capture what really occurred,
the feel of the courtroom has no bearing on the parts of the departure
decision that this Note advocates should be reviewed de novo-specifically,
the court's analysis of the purposes of sentencing and the assessment of
what the Guidelines mean.
Given that the primary goal of the SRA is to curb sentencing
disparities, limiting judges' reliance on their "feel" for cases during
sentencing makes sense. After all, one of the central purposes of appellate
review, according to Professor Judith Resnik, is "the distillation of a
problem-the provision of a delayed consideration of a dispute, after issues
have been considered before."' 155 Consider the following example: Ninth
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski recently explained to a reporter how in 1988,
after accepting a temporary assignment in district court, he had to sentence
a twenty-three-year-old woman who was convicted of possessing five
kilograms of cocaine. The Guidelines had just been enacted, and Judge
Kozinski had already garnered a reputation as a law-and-order conservative
with little sympathy for criminals. But he sentenced the woman to just six
months in jail, plus community service and probation, as opposed to the ten
years asked for by the prosecution. Given a chance to reconsider his
decision, he declined because "[t]here she was in front of me with her
family. I just felt like, having set her on this track, I had a responsibility to
her."' 156 Judge Kozinski's feel for the case arguably corrupted his legal
judgment-something the passage of the SRA was designed to prevent. In
contrast, appellate judges have the ability to distill the issues involved in
sentencing and are not biased by their personal experience with the
defendant. They therefore are, if anything, more qualified than district
judges to assess the legal bases for departures.
C. The Role of the Sentencing Commission
The third significant argument given in favor of the abuse-of-discretion
standard is that greater appellate involvement in sentencing would hinder
the Sentencing Commission's efforts to monitor and learn from the
153. Id. at *I n.3.
154. Id.
155. Judith Resnick [sic], The Death of Appeals?, 5 FIFTH CIRCUIT REP. 637, 642 (1988).
156. Emily Bazelon, The Big Kozinski, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 24, 28 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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decisions of district courts. In United States v. Wright, then-Judge Breyer
wrote: "Too intrusive a standard of appellate review could impede the
Commission's efforts to learn from district courts' experience.' 57 The
argument is that if appellate courts were to put their weight either in favor
of or in opposition to a departure determination, district courts would have
no choice but to follow these prescriptions rather than determine on their
own what sentences are appropriate. This hypothetical reaction would then
deprive the Commission of valuable information. Steven Zipperstein, a
former Assistant U.S. Attorney who has written extensively about the
Guidelines, took the argument further in his warning against de novo
review: "[A]ppellate courts exceed their authority when they effectively
add new provisions to the guidelines, when they announce new criteria
permitting departures, and when they otherwise use the power of de novo
review to announce rules that undermine the purposes of the guidelines. 158
This argument is flawed in three ways. First, the Sentencing
Commission already has plenty of information to use in reviewing the
Guidelines. Over the past seventeen years, the Commission has received
documentation on hundreds of thousands of cases and tens of thousands of
departures. 159 It is difficult to imagine how de novo review would limit the
information available to the Commission to the point where it would be
unable to fulfill its statutory duties. This outcome is particularly unlikely
considering the Feeney Amendment's new reporting requirements, 60 which
will lead to considerably more rather than less information and clarity about
the decisions made by district courts.
Second, many district judges will be willing to speak out regardless of
the rulings of their appellate bench. Then-Judge Breyer's argument assumes
that when district judges believe a departure is appropriate-but don't give
one due to the specter of being reversed on appeal-they will keep quiet
about it. However, the evidence in the months since the passage of the
Feeney Amendment suggests that this is not always true, thus leaving open
the opportunity for the Sentencing Commission to continue to learn from
district courts in the most difficult cases. For example, in October 2003,
Judge Webb of the District of North Dakota, after having a sentence of his
vacated by the Eighth Circuit, wrote a "Dissent upon Imposition of
Sentence" explaining his "honest disagreement" with the appellate court's
157. 873 F.2d 437, 444 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.) (citation omitted).
158. Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty: Appellate Review and the Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 621, 638 (1992).
159. In fiscal year 2001 alone, the Commission received documentation on 59,897 cases
sentenced under the Guidelines. Of the 54,851 cases for which the Commission had sufficient
data, 18.3% were non-governmental-assistance downward departures. See 2001 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 66, at 53 tbl.26.
160. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(w) (West Supp. 2003).
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reading of the Guidelines.1 61 That same month, Judge Magnuson of the
District of Minnesota refused to depart in a fraud case, but added in his
opinion: "If the Court were to depart... [t]he Attorney General would then
report the departure to Congress, and Congress could call the undersigned
to testify and attempt to justify the departure .... [T]he Court is scared to
depart. 162 And of course in Thurston, despite the First Circuit's exercise of
de novo review, Judge Harrington made clear his displeasure with the
panel's application of the Guidelines. Thus, the fear that less deferential
review might leave the Sentencing Commission ignorant of information
crucial to assessing the Guidelines seems exaggerated.
Third, the Commission has had seventeen years to clarify and revise the
Guidelines, yet in many circumstances has abrogated its responsibility. The
original introduction to the Guidelines Manual states: "By monitoring when
courts depart from the guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for
doing so, the Commission, over time, will be able to create more accurate
guidelines that specify precisely where departures should and should not be
permitted., 163 The problem is that when the Commission plays the role of
Supreme Court to resolve conflicts among the circuits, it almost never
explains or justifies its resolutions, turning the Guidelines into
"administrative diktats" rather than carefully reasoned and explained
rules. 
64
Perhaps it is time to give the courts of appeals the opportunity to make
sense of the Guidelines. Appellate courts that wisely exercise their powers
of de novo review can create a substantive body of law complete with
explanations of their decisions, unlike the "diktats" of the Commission.
Importantly, as explained in Part II, the sentencing statute commands courts
of appeals to look beyond the confines of the Sentencing Manual when
considering departures and to ensure that a given sentence is in accord with
the purposes of sentencing.' 65 Also, the Feeney Amendment explicitly
prohibits the Sentencing Commission from promulgating any new guideline
that adds new grounds for downward departures until May 1, 2005,166 and
reduces the ability of judges to influence the future content of the
Guidelines by ensuring that judges can never be a majority on the
Commission. 167 Thus appellate courts have the power to achieve what the
Commission has thus far failed to do and is, at least temporarily, prohibited
from doing: They can define and explain how specific departures comport
with the general principles of sentencing.
161. United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1017 (D.N.D. 2003) (Webb, J.).
162. United States v. Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1006-07 (D. Minn. 2003) (Magnuson, J.).
163. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.I editorial note pt. A(4)(b) (2003).
164. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 23, at 95-99.
165. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000). The Feeney Amendment did not change this command.
166. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(j)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 673 (2003).
167. See id. § 401(n), 117 Stat. at 675-76 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)).
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Taken together, the arguments in favor of the Koon abuse-of-discretion
standard are outweighed by the potential for de novo review to inspire the
courts of appeals to take more responsibility for the fairness of the
Guidelines regime and to create a substantive common law of sentencing
departures. A reexamination-of Thurston further supports this argument and
also provides the opportunity to show what de novo review, when exercised
with wisdom and forethought, would look like in practice.
V. REVISITING THURSTON
After the First Circuit's initial decision, William Thurston petitioned
the panel to rehear the case and the full court of appeals to take the case en
banc. The Federal Defender Office submitted an amicus brief sharply
critical of the First Circuit's use of de novo review. In response, the panel
withdrew its opinion from publication. In February 2004, the First Circuit
issued a new ruling, this time with a more careful analysis of the Feeney
Amendment. But the court again rejected Judge Harrington's departures. 168
Judge Harrington had provided two grounds for departing from the
Guidelines: (1) The president of the company, who had pled nolo
contendere, had received only three months' probation for the same
offense; and (2) Thurston had demonstrated an extraordinary record of
service to his community. 169 The First Circuit's rejection of the first
departure ground was uncontroversial, as Judge Harrington had ignored the
circuit's case law on the issue. 170 The good works departure, on the other
hand, would likely have been upheld had the First Circuit reviewed it only
for abuse of discretion. This was a "heartland" departure, as it involved
circumstances mentioned in, but not fully prohibited by, the Guidelines.
Section 5Hl.11 of the Guidelines states: "Military, civic, charitable, or
public service; employment-related contributions; and similar prior good
works are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should
be outside the applicable guideline range." 171 Judge Harrington, therefore,
had to show that Thurston's good works were exceptional-that the
circumstances in this case were different enough from the good works
168. See United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 55 (1st Cir. 2004).
169. Id. at 54.
170. As far back as 1991, the First Circuit had concluded that, absent a showing of additional
circumstances not considered by the Commission, the Guidelines preclude sentencing judges
from departing downward based on "a perceived need to equalize sentencing outcomes for
similarly situated codefendants." United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1448 (1st Cir. 1991). At
sentencing, Judge Harrington did not refer to any such circumstances, relying exclusively on the
disparity between Thurston's sentence and that of the company president. See Thurston, 358 F.3d
at 78. As a result, this ground for departure would likely have been reversed regardless of the
standard of review.
171. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5HI .11 (2003) (emphasis added).
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considered by the Commission as to make this case fall outside the
heartland of section 5H 1.11.
As discussed in Part 1I, the determination of whether Thurston's case
met these criteria involves two distinct inquiries. First, the sentencing court
must determine what about the case is especially mitigating. This
assessment of the quantity and quality of Thurston's good works is a factual
determination that should be given deference by the court of appeals.
Second, the court must determine what has been "adequately taken into
consideration" by the Sentencing Commission, to see whether the
mitigating circumstances warrant departure in light of the purposes of
sentencing. In other words, the court must define the guideline's heartland,
a determination that should be reviewed de novo.
Judge Harrington made several factual conclusions about Thurston's
good works: As a member of the Church of Latter-Day Saints, Thurston
tithed ten percent of his income; he devoted hours every week to unpaid
service with the church; he took family members and others into his home,
including a woman undergoing rehabilitation at a local medical center; and
he once laid sod for an infirm neighbor. 172 These conclusions should only
be reviewed for clear error since Judge Harrington, having viewed all the
testimony in person, was in a far better position than the First Circuit to
evaluate their veracity. But at sentencing Judge Harrington made an
additional conclusion: "[I]n over fourteen years of sentencing defendants,
it's my judgment that no one had a more extraordinary devotion to
charitable work, community service, and especially... to his church.,
173
How much weight should the First Circuit lend to such a statement?
The basic factual veracity of Judge Harrington's remark should be
accepted, absent clear evidence to the contrary, but it does not necessarily
follow that departure is warranted. As established in Part II, the individual
experience of a district court judge cannot be determinative as to what is
unusual or extraordinary: Judge Harrington may have had the misfortune of
seeing throughout his time on the bench only the most selfish offenders in
Massachusetts, whereas another judge may have seen ten defendants just
like Thurston. The proper way to define the heartland of section 5H 1.11 is
to examine the Guidelines themselves, including policy statements and
commentary, and to consider the purposes of sentencing as applied to the
facts of the case, in order to discern the kind of cases the guideline was
intended to cover. If other good works cases are to be considered, the
relevant universe of case law is nationwide, not limited to Judge
Harrington' s courtroom.
172. Thurston, 358 F.3d at 79.
173. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In certain ways, the First Circuit attempted to undertake this kind of
inquiry. The panel began by reviewing prior good works departure
decisions, and it looked not just within the First Circuit, but also to the
precedents of the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. 174 The panel did not,
however, cite any district court cases either within or outside of the District
of Massachusetts. 175 The panel noted that the case law, which offered "little
guidance," did suggest one important conclusion: Good works cannot be
measured by quantity alone. 176 Accordingly, the panel noted that "a
corporate executive like Thurston is better situated to make large financial
contributions than someone for whom the expenses of day-to-day life are
more pressing; indeed, business leaders are often expected, by virtue of
their positions, to engage in civic and charitable activities."'177
The panel then considered the purposes of sentencing as applied to
Thurston's case, and stated that "[o]ne of the goals of the entire guidelines
regime was to minimize discrepancies in the treatment of 'white collar' and
'blue collar' crimes." 178 It also noted that "[h]ealth care fraud is a serious
crime and the federal interest in combating it is powerful,"' 179 and that
Thurston's executive position "gave him the resources to undertake many
of his charitable works."' 80 The panel's first opinion also mentioned "the
need to deter other executives from similar lawbreaking";;181 it is not clear
why this was left out of the revised opinion.
Taking all of these factors into consideration-each of which has a
fundamentally legal, not factual, basis-the court concluded that Thurston's
good works did not fall outside the heartland of section 5H1.1 1, finding that
they were "admirable," but not "exceptional.' 82 The panel then remanded
the case for imposition of the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months. 183
While laudable in some respects, the panel's decision should not be
considered a model of de novo review. One problem stems from the panel
conducting its heartland inquiry with almost no guidance from the district
court, as Judge Harrington did not refer to the purposes of sentencing or to
other Guideline cases when granting Thurston the good works departure.1 84





179. Id. at 81.
180. Id.
181. United States v. Thurston, Nos. 02-1966, 02-1967, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15516, at *71
(1st Cir. Aug. 4, 2003), withdrawn, 358 F.3d 51.
182. Thurston, 358 F.3d at 81.
183. Id. at 82.
184. See id. at 78 n.25. Judge Harrington did, on the other hand, address the purposes of
sentencing in granting the departure based on the disparity between Thurston's sentence and that
of the company's president. See id. ("Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by
narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by
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While de novo review gives considerable authority to the courts of appeals,
it does not transform them into courts of first instance. The proper move for
the First Circuit would have been to remand the case to Judge Harrington
without an outright rejection of the good works departure, but rather with a
directive to undertake the kind of inquiry into the purposes of sentencing
and the meaning of the heartland that is commanded by the sentencing
statute and the Guidelines. Such a process would ensure that when appellate
courts sign off on--or reject-grounds for departure and thereby contribute
to a common law of sentencing, they only do so when fully informed.
Another problem with the panel decision is that it gave no guidance as
to what criteria would ever be enough for a court to grant a good works
departure. Judge Gertner explains:
As the First Circuit typically does, it cited a host of cases in which
the departure showing was inadequate, and not one in which the
case was legitimately made. It may be enough for appellate courts
to say over and over again, "No, this case is not it, nor that, nor
that." As a trial judge with a human being before me, I have to do
more. The Court cannot be saying that no white collar offender can
ever satisfy the strictures of this departure.' 85
Of course, a common law of sentencing departures must develop over
time, over hundreds or even thousands of cases. It is easy to ask a case to do
too much. But the First Circuit panel's failure to cite a single case in which
a good works departure was properly granted is a glaring omission.
Thurston thus shows the potential for de novo review-if properly
employed-to inspire both district and appellate judges to more fully
consider the purposes of sentencing in making departure determinations. As
with much of the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission's enactment of
section 5H1.11 created a "diktat" with little guidance as to what does
or does not fall under the guideline or what its purposes are. Crucial
terms such as "good works" and "ordinarily relevant" were left-and
remain-undefined, and the basic question as to why good works should
ever be a reason to lessen a sentence remains unanswered. The task of
definition has therefore been left to the courts.
Had the First Circuit panel simply deferred to the discretion of Judge
Harrington, the meaning of good works as applied to Thurston would have
been contingent on the individual experience of a single district judge,
similar offenders .... [I]t is, in my judgment, a violation of the fundamental purpose of the
Sentencing Commission Guidelines to impose a sentence which is not at least somewhat similar to
that incurred by a coconspirator who was more involved in the conspiracy t[h]an this defendant."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
185. United States v. Mehta, No. CRIM.01-10180-NG, 2004 WL 418119, at *5 (D. Mass.
Mar. 3, 2004) (Gertner, J.).
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leaving other sentencing judges with less guidance as to how to properly
interpret the guideline. But by using de novo review and making at least a
limited attempt to grapple with the underlying purposes of section 5H 1.11,
the First Circuit provided some important guidance regarding the exercise
of this kind of departure.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judges and scholars are right to be troubled by many of the provisions
of the Feeney Amendment. Its central justification-that rampant departure
decisions in the wake of Koon threatened to undermine the uniformity of
sentencing brought about by the Guidelines-was dubious at best. It is not
surprising, then, that the legal community is working furiously to have the
Amendment repealed.
But two provisions of the Amendment--de novo review and the
requirement that district courts put their reasons for sentencing departures
into writing-are worth keeping. One of the great shortcomings of the
Guidelines regime has been the failure of courts at all levels to engage in
principled analyses of sentencing rather than perfunctory enforcement of
administrative diktats cloaked as "guidelines." A central purpose of this
Note is to suggest that courts of appeals should use the Feeney
Amendment's de novo provision as an impetus to bring principle and
meaning to the Guidelines at long last. If they do so, over time the
Guidelines will become clearer and sentencing will become fairer and more
consistent. Given the historical failure of the Sentencing Commission to
explain the purposes behind the Guidelines and Congress's new limits on
the Commission's powers, the courts of appeals are the only actors in the
system capable of bringing about such dramatic change.
Of course, if the courts of appeals-out of either expedience or fear-
use de novo review simply as a bigger weapon with which to curtail
departures, we will be left with the kind of inflexible and unfair system
Congress rejected when it modified the House version of the Feeney
Amendment. We must hope that de novo review, by forcing appellate
judges to take firsthand responsibility for the outcomes of their sentencing
decisions, will inspire the courts of appeals to become strong and active
voices in favor of a more just and principled system of punishment.
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